Biological terrorism and public health.

Includes notes

Reprinted from Survival; 2001, vol. 43, no. 1; pp.93-106

Deterrence through the threat of retaliation remains the central strategy for preventing attacks using weapons of mass destruction against the United States and it's allies. Biological terrorism challenges three requirements for successful deterrence. First, it may prove difficult to identify the perpetrators due to the fact that some diseases have a lengthy incubation period. Second, a terrorist group might hope that it's attack goes unnoticed by the government. Finally, some apocalyptic or non-state groups may not be concerned about punishment. An appropriate defence has to be based on improved public health surveillance and response. Due to incubation periods, biological terrorism may bypass the traditional first- and quick-response teams that are critical in dealing with more conventional attacks. For a biological attack, the 'first-responders' will likely be health-care workers, and the speed of response will depend on how quickly they recognise that certain illnesses are appearing at abnormal levels. Regardless of whether the origin of a disease outbreak is intentional, a public-health response will be necessary to detect and contain it.