Understanding the Challenger disaster : organizational structure and the design of reliable systems.

By:

Heimann, C.F.L

Material type: Text

TextLanguage: ENG Publication details: JUN 1993Description: 15 p. : illSubject(s):

Subject: The destruction of the space shuttle Challenger was a tremendous blow to American space policy. To what extent was this loss the result of organizational factors at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration? Formulated is a comprehensive theory of organizational reliability that incorporates both type I and type II errors. These principles are then applied in a study of NASA and its administrative behavior before and after the Challenger accident

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Item type	Current library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Books	Australian Emergency Management Library	BOOK	658.403 UND (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Available		005728962

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Previous	658.403 JAN Crucial decisions: leadership in policymaking and crisis management.	658.403 NOS No surprises: the crisis communications management system.	658.403 RIS Risk and decisions.	658.403 UND Understanding the Challenger disaster : organizational structure and the design of reliable systems.	658.403 WHI Risk analysis in the private sector.	658.4030072 IND Individual, group, and organizational decision making in technological emergencies : a review of research.	658.40301 RES Risk: a philosophical introduction to the theory of risk evaluation and management.	Next

Bibliography: p. 435

Reprinted from American Political Science Review; 1993; Vol. 87; No. 2; p. 421-435

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The destruction of the space shuttle Challenger was a tremendous blow to American space policy. To what extent was this loss the result of organizational factors at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration? Formulated is a comprehensive theory of organizational reliability that incorporates both type I and type II errors. These principles are then applied in a study of NASA and its administrative behavior before and after the Challenger accident

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