Low probability - high consequence accidents : application of systems theory for preventing hazardous failures.

Reprinted from Systems Research; Vol. 9, no. 2; p. 5-58

Reprint

In the recent years there have been a number of accidents such as Flixborough, Seveso, Mexico, Bhopal, Chernobyl etc. Industrial crises are getting attention because of their increased frequency, the extensive damage they cause and their cost to organizations and society. Warfield has reported that in the light of these failures all around us there is a need to analyze these accidents using a general framework. Systems theory has an edge over scientific theories for normative applications in that they have greater unifying power, isomorphism, and heuristic value. Systems theory can help in analysing problems of hazardous facilities in terms of its interactions and linkages wheras safety engineering and hazard analysis techniques cannot help in analysing the interactions, linkages and boundaries involving factors such as multiple actors, information overload, poor feedback, and interorganisational mismatches. In this paper first, the issues involved in preventing low probability - high consequence accidents are examined by analysing the various systems involved taking the Bhopal accident as an example. The reasons for accidents in hazard prone or risky systems are highlighted using systems theory concepts. Finally, the imperatives for preventing accidents in the industrial systems are derived